Abstract-This paper considers optimal multiband transmission under hostile jamming, where both the authorized user and the jammer are power-limited and operate against each other. The strategic decision making of the authorized user and the jammer is modeled as a two-party zero-sum game, where the payoff function is the capacity that can be achieved by the authorized user in the presence of the jammer. First, we investigate the game under AWGN channels. It is found that: either for the authorized user to maximize its capacity, or for the jammer to minimize the capacity of the authorized user, the best strategy for both of them is to distribute the transmission power or jamming power uniformly over all the available spectrum. The minimax capacity can be calculated based on the channel bandwidth and the signal-to-jamming and noise ratio, and it matches with the Shannon channel capacity formula. Second, we consider frequency selective fading channels. We characterize the dynamic relationship between the optimal signal power allocation and the optimal jamming power allocation in the minimax game, and then propose an iterative water pouring algorithm to find the optimal power allocation schemes for both the authorized user and the jammer.
I. INTRODUCTION

H
OSTILE jamming, in which the authorized user's signal is deliberately interfered by the adversary, is one of the most commonly used techniques for limiting the effectiveness of an opponent's communication [1] . In traditional research on jamming strategy and jamming mitigation, there is generally an assumption that the jammer or the authorized user can access at least part of the information about the transmission pattern of its adversary. As such, the jammer can launch more effective jamming by exploiting the information it has about the authorized user, e.g., correlated jamming [2] - [4] or disguised jamming [5] - [9] . For jamming mitigation, the authorized user can mitigate the jammer's effect by applying a particular anti-jamming scheme that is robust against a specific jamming pattern [10] , [11] . The underlying assumption is that the jamming varies slowly such that the authorized user has sufficient time to track and react to the jamming.
However, if the jammer is intelligent and can switch its patterns fast enough, then it would be impossible for the authorized user to track and react in real time. In this case, when choosing the strategy to maximize its capacity, the authorized user has no knowledge of the jamming strategy. Similarly, while trying to minimize the capacity of the authorized user, the jammer has no knowledge of the user strategy, either. Regarding this scenario, there has been a surge in research that applies game theory to characterize and analyze strategies for communication systems under jamming with unpredictable strategies.
A lot of work on game theory in communications has been focused on the single user and single band case [12] - [16] . The optimal jamming strategy under the Gaussian test channel was investigated in [12] , and the worst additive noise for a communication channel under a covariance constraint was studied in [13] . The capacity of channels with block memory was investigated in [14] , which showed that both the optimal coding strategy and the optimal jamming strategy are independent from symbol to symbol within a block. The authors in [15] discussed the minimax game between an authorized user and a jammer for any combinations of "hard" or "soft" input and output quantization with additive noise and average power constraints. In [16] , a dynamic game between a communicator and a jammer was considered, where the participants choose their power levels randomly from a finite space subject to temporal energy constraints.
Application of game theory to multiuser and multiband/ multicarrier communications has been brought to attention in recent years [17] - [21] . In [17] , the authors proposed a decentralized strategy to find out the optimal precoding/multiplexing matrices for a multipoint-to-multipoint communication system composed of a set of wideband links sharing the same physical resources. In [18] , a scheme aiming for fair allocation of subcarriers, rates, and power for multiuser orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access (OFDMA) systems was proposed to maximize the overall system rate, subject to each user's maximal power and minimal rate constraints. In [19] , jamming mitigation was carried out by maximizing the sum signal-to-interference and noise ratio (SINR) for multichannel communications. In [20] , the authors considered a particular scenario where K users and a jammer share a common spectrum of N orthogonal tones, and examined how each user could maximize its own total sum rate selfishly. In [21] , the 0090-6778 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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authors investigated the secrecy capacity of the users under malicious eavesdropping and friendly jamming. Game theory has also been applied to cognitive radios and ad hoc networks [22] - [26] . New techniques for analyzing networks of cognitive radios that can alter either their power levels or their signature waveforms through the use of game models were introduced in [22] . In [23] , a game theoretic overview of dynamic spectrum sharing was provided regarding analysis of network users' behaviors, efficient dynamic distributed design, and performance optimality. A game theoretic power control framework for spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks was proposed in [24] , and the minimax game for cooperative spectrum sensing in centralized cognitive radio networks was investigated in [25] . In [26] , the authors developed a game theoretic framework to construct convergent interference avoidance (IA) algorithms in ad hoc networks with multiple distributed receivers.
For spectrum and power utilization in multiband communications, an open while interesting question is: in presence of a random and intractable opponent, can the authorized user or the jammer benefit from utilizing part instead of the entire spectrum and/or applying nonuniform power allocation?
In this paper, we try to address this question from a game theoretic perspective, taking jamming and jamming mitigation as a game between a power-limited jammer and a power-limited authorized user, who operate against each other over the same spectrum consisting of multiple bands or subchannels. The authorized user is always trying to maximize its capacity under jamming by applying an optimal strategy. Accordingly, the jammer would like to find an optimal strategy that can minimize the capacity of the authorized user. To apply a chosen strategy, the authorized user or the jammer selects a particular number of subchannels and applies a particular power allocation scheme over the selected subchannels. For both the authorized user and the jammer, the subchannels may not be chosen with equal probability. The strategic decisionmaking of the authorized user and the jammer can be modeled as a two-party zero-sum game, where the payoff function is the capacity that can be achieved by the authorized user in presence of the jammer.
Solving the zero-sum game above is equivalent to locating the saddle point, which produces optimal strategies for both the authorized user and the jammer. That is, the jammer cannot reduce the capacity of the authorized user by applying a jamming strategy different from the optimal one; meanwhile, the authorized user cannot increase its capacity by switching to another transmission strategy either. We find that: under AWGN channels, either for the authorized user to maximize its capacity, or for the jammer to minimize the capacity of the authorized user, the best strategy for both of them is to distribute the signal power or jamming power uniformly over all the available spectrum. The minimax capacity of the authorized user is given by C = B log 2 (1 +
, where B is the bandwidth of the overall spectrum, P N the noise power, P s and P J the total power of the authorized user and the jammer, respectively. In other words, the minimax capacity above is the minimal capacity that can be achieved by the authorized user if it utilizes all the available spectrum and applies uniform power allocation, no matter what strategy is applied by the jammer; meanwhile, it is also the maximal capacity that can be achieved by the authorized user if the jammer jams all the available spectrum and applies uniform power allocation, no matter what strategy is applied by the authorized user.
As can be expected, the results we obtained under AWGN channels may no longer be true for frequency selective fading channels. In the jamming-free case, it is well known that the classical water pouring algorithm provides the optimal power allocation scheme that maximizes the capacity of the authorized user under frequency selective fading channels. Naturally, the situation becomes complicated when a jammer is involved in the game.
To identify the saddle point under frequency selective fading channels, we first characterize the dynamic relationship between the optimal signal power allocation and the optimal jamming power allocation in the minimax game. Second, we show that for correlated fading channels, the closed-form solution for the saddle point can be obtained using a twostep water pouring algorithm. As a special case, it is shown that when the channel for the authorized user and the channel for the jammer are relatively flat with respect to each other, i.e., their magnitude spectrum is proportional to each other, the closed-form solution for the saddle point can be obtained. From the arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) point of view, the correlation between the user channel and the jamming channel can be regarded as an indicator of possible symmetricity between the user and the jammer. It is also observed that as long as the cross-correlation between the user channel and the jammer channel is reasonably high, the two-step water pouring algorithm can still provide a much better solution than uniform power allocation. Third, we extend the two-step approach to an iterative water pouring algorithm. The iterative algorithm can find a numerical solution to the saddle point for arbitrary fading channels. It is observed that this algorithm delivers a solution that has a notable advantage over uniform power allocation for both the authorized user and the jammer. Simulation examples are provided to illustrate our findings for both the AWGN channels and the frequency selective fading channels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the problem is formulated after the system model description. The minimax problem in the zero-sum game with an authorized user and a jammer under AWGN channels is theoretically solved in Section III. The gaming problem under frequency selective fading channels is investigated in Section IV. Numerical analysis is provided in Section V and we conclude in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Description
We consider a multiband communication system, 1 where there is an authorized user and a jammer who are operating against each other, without knowledge on the strategy applied by its opponent. Assuming that both the authorized user and the jammer can choose to operate over all or part of the N c frequency bands or subchannels (not necessarily being consecutive), each of which has a bandwidth
Hz. We start with the AWGN channel model, where all the subchannels have equal noise power, and then extend to the frequency selective fading scenario. In the AWGN case, assuming the total noise power over the entire spectrum is P N , then the noise power corresponding to each subchannel is
We assume the jamming is Gaussian over each jammed subchannel, because Gaussian jamming is the worst jamming when the jammer has no knowledge of the authorized transmission [12] . In the following, let P s denote the total signal power for the authorized user, and P J the total jamming power.
The authorized user is always trying to maximize its capacity under jamming by applying an optimal strategy on subchannel selection (either all or part) and power allocation. On the other hand, the jammer tries to find an optimal strategy that can minimize the capacity of the authorized user. In this paper, we consider the case where both the authorized user and the jammer use mixed strategies. It is assumed that both the authorized user and the jammer can adjust their subchannel selection and power allocation swiftly and randomly, such that neither of them has sufficient time to learn and react in real time before its opponent switches to new subchannels and/or power levels. In other words, when the authorized user and the jammer apply their own resource allocation strategy, they have no knowledge of the selected subchannels and power levels of their opponent.
B. Strategy Spaces for the Authorized User and the Jammer
Each mixed strategy applied by the authorized user is determined by the number of activated subchannels, the subchannel selection process and the power allocation process. for selecting a particular number of subchannels based on a given subchannel selection probability vector, ω s , is illustrated in Appendix A.) (3) For notation simplicity, the authorized user always specifies the indices of the selected K s subchannels as 1, 2, . . . , K s , following the order as they appear in the original spectrum, and performs power allocation over them. The power allocation process is characterized using a vector P s = [P s,1 , P s,2 , . . . , P s,K s ], in which P s,n denotes the power allocated to the nth selected subchannel, and
The strategy space for the authorized user can thus be defined as
(1) . . , K J in the same manner as the authorized user, and performs power allocation over them using a power-allocation vector
the strategy space for the jammer can thus be defined as
(2)
C. The Minimax Problem in the Zero-Sum Game Between the Authorized User and the Jammer
From a game theoretic perspective, the strategic decisionmaking of the authorized user and the jammer can be modeled as a two-party zero-sum game [27] , which is characterized by a triplet (X , Y , C), where 1) X is the strategy space of the authorized user; 2) Y is the strategy space of the jammer; 3) C is a real-valued payoff function defined on X × Y . The interpretation is as follows. Let (x, y) denote the strategy pair, in which x ∈ X and y ∈ Y are the strategies applied by the authorized user and the jammer, respectively. Note that both x and y are mixed strategies. The payoff function C(x, y) is therefore defined as the ergodic (i.e., expected or average) capacity of the authorized user choosing a strategy x ∈ X in presence of the jammer choosing a strategy y ∈ Y . In other words, C(x, y) is the amount that the authorized user wins and simultaneously the jammer loses in the game with a strategy pair (x, y).
Assuming that with strategy pair (x, y), the authorized user and the jammer activate K s and K J channels, respectively.
Let p(α|x) denote the probability that the subchannels selected by the authorized user follow the indicator vector α given that the strategy x ∈ X is applied, and p(β|y) the probability that the subchannels selected by the jammer follow the indicator vector β given that the strategy y ∈ Y is applied. Let T s,m and T J,m be the power allocated to the mth subchannel by the authorized user and the jammer, respectively, which are determined by
where g m = m i=1 α i is the new index of subchannel m specified by the authorized user in the K s selected subchannels if it is activated by the authorized user (α m = 1), and q m = m i=1 β i is the new index of subchannel m specified by the jammer in the K J jammed subchannels if it is activated by the jammer (β m = 1). Note that: (i) the subchannel selection processes used by the authorized user and the jammer are independent of each other; and (ii) for each strategy pair (x, y), the subchannel selection choices (α and β) are not unique for both the authorized user and the jammer. Thus, the ergodic capacity of the authorized user in the game with a strategy pair (x, y) can be calculated as
In the jamming-free case, the traditional Shannon channel capacity is obtained by maximizing the mutual information with respect to the distribution of the user signal. When jamming is around, the user still wants to maximize its capacity, while the jammer tries to minimize the user's capacity. This is why the "minimax" capacity was introduced in literature [28] - [30] , for which the mutual information is maximized with respect to the distribution of the user signal, and meanwhile minimized with respect to the distribution of the jamming. Now, in addition to optimizing the signal distribution, both the authorized user and the jammer can also choose which subchannels to use or activate, and how much power to be allocated to each activated subchannel. That is, the minimax capacity is obtained through the optimization with respect to the strategies from both the authorized user and the jammer sides, in addition to the signal distributions.
Based on the definitions and reasoning above, the minimax capacity of the authorized user is defined as
It can be seen from (5) that the authorized user tries to choose an optimal transmission strategy x * ∈ X to maximize its capacity, while the jammer tries to minimize it by choosing an optimal jamming strategy y * ∈ Y . The capacity C(x * , y * ) in (5) can be achieved when a saddle point strategy pair (x * , y * ) is chosen, which is characterized by [2] , [15] C(x, y
This implies that: with strategy x * , the minimal capacity that can be achieved by the authorized user is C(x * , y * ), no matter which strategy is applied by the jammer; on the other hand, if the jammer applies strategy y * , the maximal capacity that can be achieved by the authorized user is also C(x * , y * ), no matter which strategy is applied by the authorized user. As a result, to find the optimal transmission strategy and the worst jamming strategy under the power constraints P s and P J , we need to find the saddle point strategy pair (x * , y * ).
III. OPTIMAL STRATEGY FOR MULTIBAND COMMUNICATIONS UNDER JAMMING OVER AWGN CHANNELS
Recall that K s denotes the number of subchannels activated by the authorized user, and K J the number of subchannels interfered by the jammer. In this section, we derive the saddle point strategy pair (x * , y * ) in two steps: (1) 
A. The Minimax Problem for Fixed K s and K J
With fixed K s and K J , the strategy space for the authorized user becomes
, and similarly the strategy space for the jammer becomes
It should be noted that the useractivated subchannels and the jammed subchannels may vary from time to time, although the total number of the useractivated or jammed subchannels is fixed.
We first present two lemmas on the concavity/convexity property of two real-valued functions that will be used afterwards. More information on concavity and convexity can be found in [31] .
The second-order derivative,
The solution 2 to the minimax problem for fixed K s and K J is given in Theorem 1. 
2 The uniqueness of the solution is discussed in Appendix B.
is given by
and
In this case, the minimax capacity of the authorized user is given by
(10) Proof: (1) We first prove that the ( x * , y * ) pair defined in (8) and (9) satisfies the left part of (7), C( x, y * ) ≤ C( x * , y * ). Assume the jammer applies the strategy y * , which means uniform subchannel selection and uniform power allocation as indicated in (9) . For the authorized user who applies an arbitrary strategy x ∈ X K s , we specified the indices of the activated K s subchannels as n = 1, 2, . . . , K s . With any subchannel selection probability vector ω s ∈ W s,K s , for each subchannel activated by the authorized user, the probability that it is jammed is always
, since the jammer jams each subchannel with a uniform probability ω
, for any m = 1, 2, . . . , N c . Accordingly, the probability that each subchannel is not jammed is 1 −
. Considering all the subchannels activated by the authorized user, when the authorized user applies an arbitrary strategy x ∈ X K s , and the jammer applies strategy y * , the ergodic capacity can be calculated as the weighted average of the capacity under jamming and the capacity in the jamming-free case,
Note that K s n=1 P s,n = P s , and applying the concavity property proved in Lemma 1, we have
where the equality holds if and only if P s,n =
(2) Proof of the right part of (7), C( x * , y * ) ≤ C( x * , y). In this part of the proof, we will show that applying uniform subchannel selection and uniform power allocation strategy x * at the authorized user side guarantees a lower bound on its capacity, no matter what strategy is applied by the jammer. Assume the authorized user applies the strategy x * as indicated in (8) . For the jammer who applies an arbitrary strategy y ∈ Y K J , we specified the indices of the jammed K J subchannels as n = 1, 2, . . . , K J . With any subchannel selection probability vector ω J ∈ W J,K J , for each jammed or jammingfree subchannel, the probability that it serves as a subchannel activated by the authorized user is always
. Hence, the average number 3 of jammed subchannels which are also activated by the authorized user is
, and the average number of jamming-free subchannels which are activated by the authorized user would be
Considering both the jammed and jamming-free subchannels, when the jammer applies an arbitrary strategy y ∈ Y K J , and the authorized user applies strategy x * , the ergodic capacity can be calculated as
Note that K J n=1 P J,n = P J , and applying the convexity property proved in Lemma 2, we have
where the equality holds if and only if P J,n =
B. Capacity Optimization Over K s and K J
In Section III-A, we derived the closed-form minimax capacity of the authorized user for fixed K s and K J . Considering all possible K s and K J , we would have an
is the minimax capacity of the authorized user for fixed K s and K J , as indicated in (10) . Now finding the minimax capacity in (5) can be reduced to finding the saddle point of the matrix C, that is, the entry C(i, j ), which is simultaneously the minimum of the i th row and the maximum of the j th column.
To locate the saddle point of matrix C, we need Lemma 3. Lemma 3: For the capacity function
we have
Proof: See Appendix C. Following Lemma 3, we have the following theorem. Theorem 2: The saddle point of matrix C is indexed by
(18) Combining Theorems 1 and 2, we can obtain the saddle point to the original minimax problem in (5) 
where B is the bandwidth of the overall spectrum, P N the noise power, P s and P J the total power for the authorized user and the jammer, respectively. Proof: The proof follows directly from Theorems 1 and 2. The minimax capacity in (19) can be derived simply by substituting K s = K J = N c into (10).
IV. OPTIMAL STRATEGY FOR MULTIBAND COMMUNICATIONS UNDER JAMMING OVER FREQUENCY SELECTIVE FADING CHANNELS
In this section, we investigate the optimal strategies for both the authorized user and the jammer in multiband communications under frequency selective fading channels.
A. The Minimax Problem for Fading Channels
Recall that the power allocation for the authorized user is characterized using the vector P s = [P s,1 , P s,2 , . . . , P s,N c ], where P s,i denotes the power allocated to the i th subchannel, and N c i=1 P s,i = P s is the signal power constraint. Similarly, the power allocation vector for the jammer is [H J,1 , H J,2 , . . . , H J,N c ] the frequency domain channel response vector for the jammer, respectively.
Under the settings specified above, the capacity of the authorized user can be calculated as
where
is the original noise power for each subchannel, and σ 2
The minimax capacity of the authorized user is defined as
As before, the authorized user tries to apply optimal signal power allocation P * s ∈ P s to maximize its capacity, while the jammer tries to minimize it by applying optimal jamming power allocation P * J ∈ P J . 
can be characterized by
where (x) + = max{0, x}, sgn(·) is the sign function, and c 1 , c 2 are constants determined by the power constraints. Proof:
(1) We first prove that the (P * s , P * J ) pair defined in (23) satisfies the left part of (22) , C(P s , P * J ) ≤ C(P * s , P * J ), ∀P s ∈ P s . With the jammer applying power allocation P * J , the equivalent jamming power for the i th subchannel after fading and equalization would be (20) . Taking both the jamming and the noise into account, the overall interference and noise power level for the i th subchannel at the receiver would be
. As a result, the problem now turns to be the capacity maximization problem for multiband communications with nonuniform noise power levels. To this end, it is well known that the classical water pouring algorithm produces the best solution [32] . In this particular case, the water pouring solution for optimal signal power allocation would be
which maximizes the capacity of the authorized user, C(P * s , P * J ), while the jammer applying power allocation P * J . Note that c 2 is a constant that should be chosen such that the power constraint for the authorized user is satisfied, i.e.,
To this end, we need to find the optimal jamming power allocation P * J , which can minimize the capacity of the authorized user applying power allocation P * s . Let
With the authorized user applying power allocation P * s , following (20) , the optimization problem for jamming power allocation can be formulated as min
Note that in this optimization problem, we have both equality and inequality constraints. Hence, we need to take the KarushKuhn-Tucker (KKT) approach [31] , which generalizes the conventional method of Lagrange multipliers by allowing inequality constraints. As observed in (24), for P * s,i > 0,
In addition, the capacity of any subchannel with zero signal power (i.e., P * s,i = 0) is zero. Define
where u = [u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u N c ] and v are Lagrange multipliers that should satisfy the KKT conditions as below:
The first-order partial differentiation with respect to each P J,i can be calculated as
For each subchannel with nonzero signal power (i.e., P * s,i > 0), applying the KKT conditions and eliminating u i , we have
Solving (29), the optimal jamming power for the i th subchannel (with nonzero signal power) can be obtained as
Similarly, for each subchannel with zero signal power (i.e., P * s,i = 0), applying the KKT conditions and eliminating u i , we have v P J,i = 0. It is observed from (29) 
where c 1 should be chosen such that the power constraint for the jammer is satisfied, i.e., N c i=1 P * J,i = P J . This is exactly the optimal jamming power allocation as expressed in (23a), which minimizes the capacity of the authorized user, C(P * s , P * J ), given that the authorized user applies power allocation P * s .
B. Correlated Fading Channels: A Two-Step Water Pouring Algorithm
Theorem 4 characterizes the dynamic relationship between the optimal signal power allocation P * s and the optimal jamming power allocation P * J . As shown in (23), due to the mutual dependency between P * s and P * J , it is generally difficult to find an exact solution for them. However, in this subsection, we will show that if the channels of the authorized user and the jammer are correlated, the saddle point, (P * s , P * J ), can be calculated explicitly using a two-step water pouring algorithm.
Theorem 5 (A Two-Step Water Pouring Algorithm): With the same conditions as in Theorem 4, the saddle point, which indicates the optimal signal power allocation and the optimal jamming power allocation, is given by
as long as
where ( 
The basic idea here is that given zero signal power for a particular subchannel, it is apparently not necessary to allocate positive jamming power in that subchannel; at the same time, over all the subchannels with nonzero signal power, the optimal jamming power allocation can be formed using the water pouring algorithm. We start by applying the water pouring algorithm over all subchannels,
For the optimality of (34), we further need to ensure that P * J,i = 0, whenever P * s,i = 0. As can be seen, a violation occurs (P * J,i > 0 and P * s,i = 0), if and only if for some subchannel indexed by i ,
which yields
Note that σ 2 n,i = σ 2 n |H s,i | 2 . Hence, the conditions characterized in (33) ensure that no violation occurs, and therefore the saddle point calculated by (32) is valid for both capacity maximization by the authorized user and capacity minimization by the jammer.
In the following, we consider a special case where the channels corresponding to the authorized user and the jammer are relatively flat with respect to each other, that is, their magnitude spectrum is proportional to each other, i.e.,
As will be shown in Corollary 1, when the user channel and the jammer channel are relatively flat with respect to each other, the conditions in (33) are always satisfied, and the saddle point calculation can be simplified accordingly.
Corollary 1: With the same conditions as in Theorem 4, if the magnitude spectrum of the channels for the authorized user and the jammer is proportional to each other, i.e., |H J,i | 2
|H s,i | 2 = γ , ∀i , the saddle point, which indicates the optimal signal power allocation and the optimal jamming power allocation, can be calculated as for the authorized user and the jammer (i.e.,
. This ensures that the conditions specified in (33) are always satisfied. Hence, the solution calculated by (37) must be a valid saddle point.
Furthermore, if the magnitude spectrum of channels for the authorized user and the jammer is equal to each other, i.e.,
|H s,i | 2 = γ = 1, ∀i , the two-step water pouring algorithm in (37) can be graphically illustrated in Fig. 1 , where the saddle point can simply be obtained by pouring all the signal power after pouring all the jamming power into a tank with given noise power levels. We would like to point out that under AWGN channels, the noise power levels are flat; hence, the water pouring process here would result in uniform power allocation for both the jammer and the authorized user, which echoes the results in Section III.
Discussions: Theorem 5 provides an efficient two-step water pouring algorithm to calculate the saddle point of the minimax problem. This algorithm guarantees a valid saddle point under certain conditions as illustrated in (33) . Corollary 1 further shows a sufficient (but may not be necessary) condition for (33) being satisfied: the channels for the authorized user and the jammer are relatively flat with respect to each other, i.e., their magnitude spectrum is proportional to each other. From the arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) [5] , [6] point of view, the correlation between the user channel and the jamming channel can be regarded as an indicator of possible symmetricity between the user and the jammer. In the case that the user channel and the jammer channel are not relatively flat with respect to each other, as shown in Section V-B, as long as the cross correlation between the two channels is reasonably high, we found that the algorithm in Theorem 5 can still provide a much better solution than uniform power allocation.
C. Arbitrary Fading Channels: An Iterative Water Pouring Algorithm
The two-step water pouring algorithm in Theorem 5 is a very efficient solution for correlated fading channels. However, if the channels of the authorized user and the jammer are not correlated, the algorithm needs to be extended. Motivated by [33] , in this subsection, we will propose an iterative water pouring algorithm, which is able to find a numerical solution to the saddle point for arbitrary fading channels.
We first begin with the two-step water pouring algorithm in Theorem 5, since it is a good starting point with possibly only a few violations against (33) . We can then try to remove or at least alleviate the violations identified. Recall that in the twostep water pouring algorithm, we first allocate the jamming power by
which is equivalent to
The physical meaning of (39) is that: for each subchannel i with positive jamming power allocation (i.e., P * J,i > 0), the effective jamming power,
|H s,i | 2 c 1 > c 2 , the allocated jamming power for this subchannel would be more than necessary. The underlying argument is that: to prevent or discourage the transmission of the authorized user in a particular subchannel, it would be good enough to make sure the water level after jamming power allocation,
In this case, according to (32b), the authorized user would have already been discouraged from allocating any power in this subchannel. Hence, any jamming power that results into a water level higher than c 2 would be more than necessary. Based on the reasoning above, (39) should be revised to 
Replacing the jamming power allocation in Theorem 5 by (41), we have
Then we can approximate the optimal power allocation pair by alternatively running (42a) and (42b) until it converges. Following this idea, we propose an iterative water pouring algorithm, which is summarized in Table I . It should be noted that: for the jamming power allocation in step 3, c 2 is known from previous calculations. As a result, for each water pouring step throughout the algorithm, there is strictly only one constant unknown, and it can be determined by an efficient binary search algorithm [34] . The convergence analysis of the iterative water pouring algorithm can be found in Appendix D.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the impact of different strategies applied by the authorized user and the jammer on the capacity of the authorized user through numerical examples. In the following, we assume N c = 64, B = 1 MHz, P s = P J = 16 W. Both AWGN channels and frequency selective fading channels are evaluated.
A. AWGN Channels
In this subsection, we investigate AWGN channels, where the overall signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is set to 10dB. In light of Theorem 1, we assume that both the authorized user and the jammer apply uniform subchannel selection, that is, all subchannels are equally probable to be selected. 
1) Capacity v.s. Power Allocation With Fixed K s and K J :
In this example, we evaluate the capacity of the authorized user under different transmit and jamming power allocation schemes. We set the power allocation vector as one whose elements, if sorted, would form an arithmetic sequence, and we use the maximum power difference among all the selected subchannels as the metric of uniformity. Hence, the maximum power difference indicates how far the power allocation is away from being uniform, and a zero difference means uniform power allocation. Fig. 2 shows the results when both the authorized user and the jammer select half of all the available subchannels each time, while Fig. 3 corresponds to the case where both of them select all the available subchannels. In the 2D view, we evaluate the capacity in two scenarios: (1) uniform jamming power allocation, while the power allocation for the authorized user is nonuniform; (2) the case which is exactly opposite to (1). The 3D counterpart in these two figures provides spacial views on the physical meanings of the derived saddle points. Note that the saddle point is reached at one of the vertices, hence the 3D view includes only a quarter portion of a regular saddle-point graph. From Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 , it can be seen that, when the number of user-activated subchannels K s and the number of jammed subchannels K J are both fixed: (1) if the jammer applies uniform power allocation, the authorized user maximizes its capacity when it applies uniform power allocation as well; (2) if the authorized user applies uniform power allocation, the jammer minimizes the capacity of the authorized user when it applies uniform power allocation as well; (3) the minimax capacity (the intersections in 2D view and the labeled saddle points in 3D view) serves as a lower bound when the authorized user applies uniform power allocation under all possible jamming power allocation schemes, and simultaneously it serves as an upper bound when the jammer applies uniform power allocation under all possible signal power allocation schemes. The results above match well with Theorem 1.
2) Capacity v.s. Number of Selected Subchannels: In this example, we evaluate the capacity of the authorized user with different number of selected subchannels by the authorized user or the jammer. For each possible pair (K s , K J ), both the authorized user and the jammer apply uniform power allocation. It is observed in Fig. 4 that the best strategy is to utilize all the N c subchannels, either for the authorized user to maximize its capacity, or for the jammer to minimize the capacity of the authorized user. This result matches well with Theorem 2.
B. Frequency Selective Fading Channels
In this subsection, we investigate frequency selective fading channels. Both the two-step water pouring algorithm for correlated fading channels and the iterative water pouring algorithm for arbitrary fading channels are evaluated.
1) Two-Step Water Pouring Algorithm for Correlated Fading Channels:
To address the correlation between channels for the authorized user and the jammer, we introduce a correlation index, λ(0 ≤ λ ≤ 1), which characterizes how much dependence the two channels have on each other. More specifically, in this simulation example, we generate the magnitude spectrum of channels in two steps: (1) create two random vectors,
, in which all x 1,i and x 2,i are independent random variables with uniform distribution over (0,1); (2) generate the magnitude spectrum of the channel for the authorized user by assigning |H s,i | 2 = x 1,i , ∀i , and that for the jammer as
Particularly, λ = 1 generates equal channel magnitude spectrum for the authorized user and the jammer, while λ = 0 generates completely independent channel magnitude spectrum.
In Fig. 5 , with the SNR being set to 10dB, we compare the capacity of the authorized user in three cases with different power allocation strategies: (1) both the authorized user and the jammer perform power allocation by the two-step water pouring algorithm; (2) the authorized user performs power allocation by the two-step water pouring algorithm, while the jammer performs uniform power allocation; (3) the jammer performs power allocation by the two-step water pouring algorithm, while the authorized user performs uniform power allocation.
There are four main observations: (1) the authorized user always has a higher capacity if he performs signal power allocation by the two-step water pouring algorithm, compared to uniform signal power allocation; (2) the capacity of the authorized user decreases significantly if the channel of the jammer is more correlated with that of the authorized user, which implies that the jammer can enhance its jamming effect by delivering jamming power through a channel that is correlated with the authorized user's channel; (3) in a more serious case with high channel correlation, the jammer can limit the capacity of the authorized user more effectively by performing jamming power allocation by the two-step water pouring algorithm, compared to uniform jamming power allocation; (4) if the jammer is not able to achieve high channel correlation, uniform jamming power allocation is preferred instead of applying the two-step water pouring algorithm.
In Fig. 6 , with the channel correlation index being set to λ = 0.75, we compare the capacity of the authorized user with different power allocation versus varying SNR. It is observed that: (1) with reasonably high correlation between the user channel and the jamming channel, the power allocation strategy given by the two-step water pouring algorithm has a notable advantage over uniform power allocation, either for the authorized user to maximize its capacity, or for the jammer to minimize the capacity of the authorized user; (2) when the SNR is sufficiently high, the jamming power allocation produced by the two-step water pouring algorithm converges to uniform.
2) Iterative Water Pouring Algorithm for Arbitrary Fading Channels: In this simulation, the channel magnitude spectrum of the authorized user and the jammer are completely independent, which is equivalent to λ = 0 in the correlated fading channel setting. Similarly, we compare the capacity of the authorized user in three cases using the same setting as in the previous example, except that the two-step water pouring algorithm is replaced by the iterative water pouring algorithm. In Fig. 7 , again, it is observed that: the iterative water pouring algorithm has a notable advantage over uniform power allocation, either for the authorized user to maximize its capacity, or for the jammer to minimize the capacity of the authorized user.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered jamming and jamming mitigation as a game between a power-limited jammer and a power-limited authorized user, who operate against each other over the same spectrum consisting of multiple bands. The strategic decision-making of the authorized user and the jammer was modeled as a two-party zero-sum game, where the payoff function is the capacity that can be achieved by the authorized user in presence of the jammer. Under AWGN channels, we found that either for the authorized user to maximize its capacity, or for the jammer to minimize the capacity of the authorized user, the best strategy for both of them is to distribute the signal power or jamming power uniformly over all the available spectrum. Under frequency selective fading channels, we first characterized the dynamic relationship between the optimal signal power allocation and the optimal jamming power allocation in the minimax game, and then proposed an iterative water pouring algorithm to find the optimal power allocation schemes for both the authorized user and the jammer. Numerical results were provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed strategies for both AWGN and frequency selective fading channels. 
As a result, we can conclude that the probability that the mth subchannel is selected resulted from the proposed approach is P m = ω m .
APPENDIX B UNIQUENESS OF THE SOLUTION TO THEOREM 1
It is stated in Theorem 1 that: assuming there are K s subchannels activated by the authorized user and K J subchannels interfered by the jammer, the saddle point is reached when both authorized user and the jammer choose to apply uniform subchannel selection and uniform power allocation strategy. In this appendix, we show the uniqueness of this solution.
First, it is impossible to have nonuniform subchannel selection in a saddle point strategy pair. The reason is that: if either the authorized user or the jammer applies nonuniform subchannel selection, the nonuniform pattern could be detected and utilized by the other. That is, the authorized user could avoid the subchannels that are highly likely interfered by the jammer, while the jammer would prefer to interfere the subchannels that are highly likely used by the authorized user.
Second, with uniform subchannel selection for both the authorized user and the jammer, it is impossible to have nonuniform power allocation in a saddle point strategy pair. We will start with the case where the authorized user tries to maximize its capacity. We assume that the jamming power allocation (not necessarily uniform) is characterized by P *
, and different jamming power levels are assigned to the jammed subchannel randomly. That is, if a subchannel is jammed, the jamming power could be any P * J,m (1 ≤ m ≤ K J ) with equal probability,
The reason for random assignment is similar to uniform subchannel selection, i.e., the signal power allocation with a fixed pattern could also be detected and utilized by the jammer. Applying a similar idea to (11) and considering all possible jamming power for each jammed subchannel, the capacity of the authorized user can be calculated as
Substituting (44) and (45) into (43), we have
where the equality holds if and only if P s,n = P s K s , ∀n. So far, we have proved that: with random jamming power allocation, the authorized user can maximize its capacity only by uniform power allocation. For the jammer to minimize the capacity of the authorized user, we can obtain a similar result by applying the same method.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 3
To prove Lemma 3, we need the following result:
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 3.
(1) The first-order derivative of C over K s , 
(2) The first-order derivative of C over K J , 
APPENDIX D CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS OF THE ITERATIVE WATER POURING ALGORITHM
We prove the convergence of the iterative water pouring algorithm (please refer to Table I ) by using the fact that an upper bounded and monotonically increasing sequence must converge. More specifically, we show that the constant c 2 in the algorithm is both upper bounded and monotonically increasing.
Since the total power of both the authorized user and the jammer is limited and the noise power levels are fixed, the water level, c 2 , must be upper bounded. Next, we will show c 2 increases for each iteration. Recall that in the iterative water pouring algorithm, c 2 is initialized with the solution obtained using the two-step water pouring algorithm, and then we iteratively execute the following two steps: ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ |H s,i | 2 c 1 < c 2 ). In this case, the total jamming power below the water level c 2 goes higher, which will inevitably raise the water level c 2 once (51b) is executed.
Starting from the second iteration, since c 2 has been increased by the previous iteration, when reallocating the jamming power by (51a), "jamming-efficient" subchannels will be "relaxed" (due to higher c 2 ) in the sense of being able to use more jamming power. A subchannel is said to be more jamming-efficient, if it has a lower jamming power path loss but higher user signal path loss, i.e., the ratio |H J,i | 2 |H s,i | 2 is larger. For this reason, even the total original jamming power remains constant, the total "effective" jamming power below the water level c 2 , which takes pass loss into account, would go higher again, due to increased contribution of highly jammingefficient subchannels. This will again raise the water level c 2 once (51b) is executed. Now we are safe to say that the constant c 2 increases iteration by iteration. 
